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Abstract 
This paper explores the politics of the 2014 floods in the contentious and conflict-prone 
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The September 2014 floods were the most serious 
natural disaster in the state in the past 60 years, and affected some two million people in 
the Kashmir valley. Drawing on qualitative interview evidence from 50 flood victims in 
south, central and north Kashmir, the paper examines the extent to which the disaster 
transformed existing political narratives. In doing so, it examines the role of the state and 
central governments, the army, local volunteers, and the media. The paper engages with 
the politics of disaster literature, exploring how disasters can serve as a lens rather than as a 
catalyst, and stressing the relevance of understanding the social construction of disaster 
narratives. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural disasters are viewed as politically potent and transformative ‘tipping points’ – that is, 
as moments in which deeply etched political narratives and relationships are transcended 
and transformed. This paper opens up and engages with this and other related questions on 
the politics of natural disasters by drawing on qualitative evidence collected from affected 
people in the immediate aftermath of a large natural disaster in late 2014 in the politically 
contentious Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
 
The 2014 floods in Jammu and Kashmir were by far the most serious natural disaster in living 
memory in the state, and directly affected two million people. Heavy monsoon rains for five 
consecutive days led to landslides and rising water levels which completely inundated 
thousands of villages and large parts of the state capital Srinagar under 15 or more feet of 
water. Hundreds of thousands were displaced by the floods for up to a month, often 
returning to find their houses destroyed and assets lost.   
 
The widespread destruction wrought by the floods inevitably intersected with the intense 
political contentions and divisions on the ground. Jammu and Kashmir is a divided and 
disputed territory, the subject of rival international claims and wars fought between India 
and Pakistan since independence in 1947. In the Kashmir valley, which is over 95 percent 
Muslim and falls in the Indian part of the state, there is widespread and open hostility to 
Indian rule and deep resentment towards its security forces. This stems, on the one hand, 
from the larger unresolved and long-festering political problem which is a legacy of the 
disputed incorporation of the state into India in 1947: Kashmiris are very conscious of their 
politically ambiguous status, and aspire for a final political resolution to the dispute. But, on 
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the other hand, anger at the Indian state also has a sharper, more recent edge stemming 
from the unhealed scars of the brutal militancy and counter-insurgency period of the early 
1990s, in which an unknown number of people – assumed to be in the tens of thousands – 
were killed or tortured or disappeared (Schofield 1996, Bose 2003, Ganguly 2003).  
 
Armed militancy has subsided significantly since it peaked in 2002, and the everyday security 
situation for civilians was by the time of the floods in 2014 much improved. Yet the 
relationship between the state and the people remained tense and prone to breakdown. 
Kashmiris manifestly resent Indian rule, view the security forces as an alien army of 
occupation, and are scornful of local electoral politics as an instrument of this. Yet the 
impossibility of changing this painful reality means that people’s anger and anguish feed their 
bitterness and impotent rage. Even isolated incidents of violence involving the security forces 
spark valley-wide protests lasting several days. 
 
In 2009, there was a wave of protests over the rape and murder of two young women in the 
southern district of Shopian. In 2010, there was an even longer and more protracted wave of 
unrest and ‘stone pelting’ in which over one hundred people were killed. In 2013, the valley 
erupted in protests for days over the execution of Afzal Guru, a Kashmiri convicted for the 
2001 attack on the Indian parliament (Kak 2011, Duschinski and Hoffman 2011, Fazili 2014). 
In 2016, 50 people including two policemen were killed in the widespread unrest which 
followed the killing of militant leader Burhan Wani by security forces.  
 
As such, Kashmir has been locked in a state of wounded abnormality for so long that the 
extraordinary has become routinized, part of the ordinary. People factor the likelihood of 
 
 
4 
sudden disruptions into their coping strategies of normal life. Everyday forms of resistance 
against the status quo co-exist alongside the everyday necessity to collaborate with it. It is 
this context which forms the point of departure for  understanding the politics of the 2014 
floods: the sudden crisis triggered by a natural disaster was layered over what was a 
protracted, pre-existing political crisis. 
 
The agenda and contribution of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, it brings to light narratives of 
the disaster as it was felt from the ground. As Ed Simpson notes in relation to the Bhuj 
earthquake, disaster narratives are written largely from “above” and “the outside” (Simpson 
2013). This paper seeks instead to ask how victims experienced and understood the 2014 
floods, and how they are trying to emerge from it. It provides insights into the circumstances 
and consequences of the flooding, destruction, rescue and relief, and casts light on the role 
of different actors such as the state government, the Indian media, the Indian army and local 
volunteers.  
 
In doing so, this part of the paper draws upon the idea of disaster as a lens. That is, disasters 
provide a revealing moment of transparent, raw clarity into social realities which are 
otherwise obscured. Many elements of the survivor narratives take the form of insights into 
normal life which people gain under conditions of the disaster. By examining survivor 
narratives, it becomes possible not only to access those insights, but in turn also to learn 
something of the nature of the lens itself. That is, the retelling of disaster experiences is 
significant not only for bringing these often-obscured narratives to light, but also for what it 
says of the narrators themselves and for the way the social construction of the disaster 
occurs and is committed to historical memory.  
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Secondly, the paper explores the larger political implications of the floods and connects this 
to the comparative debates on the politics of natural disasters. In particular, it engages with 
the idea of disaster as a political rupture – as a ‘tipping point’, or watershed moment of far-
reaching consequence. We examine the extent to which events in Kashmir and survivor 
narratives bear this out. More specifically, the paper draws on survivor narratives to examine 
the issue of whether the disaster was politically transformative, and how the dynamics of 
political tipping points and transformations unfold. However, in doing so, we are also alert to 
the possibility that this idea operates at a variety of different levels, including within the 
expectations and instrumental actions of the various actors on the ground. We draw on the 
Kashmir case in order to examine whether and how the notion of political transformation 
actually takes shape in the dynamics of disaster politics. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There has been a growing body of research in recent years on the politics of natural disasters, 
within which there are six important strands of literature of significance from which to draw 
and engage. 
 
Firstly, and as an entry point to the literature as a whole, there is the compulsion to socialise 
and politicise natural disasters, which are otherwise viewed in entirely scientific and technical 
terms. This literature, which is broadly sympathetic to and derivative of critical political 
ecology (Forsyth 2004), has sought to emphasise the human element over the physical. This 
paper is fundamentally located within this milieu – that is, it is informed in its broader 
assumptions, axioms and sensibility by the imperative to stress the ‘disaster’ aspects over the 
 
 
6 
‘natural’, and to view the event in terms of the social and political nature of its causation and 
consequences (Wisner et al. 2004, Albala-Bertrand 1993, Olson 2000, Pelling and Dill 2006, 
Guggenheim 2014).  
 
Secondly, disasters serve as a moment of stark political revelation. As Guggenheim (2014: 6-
7) explains, disasters are 'empirical sites to understand politics…they decompose what is 
usually difficult to analyse'. The abrupt suspension of normal life lifts the veil and provides 
profound, raw, undisguised – and frequently very shocking – insights into the inner structures 
of that world. It is this idea that serves as the premise from which this paper seeks to gain 
access to the landscape of disaster politics. The relationship between state and society, 
tested under duress, becomes transparent in the public domain. As Cuny (1983: 54) writes, 
‘disasters often highlight the social struggles in a society and underscore the inherent 
inequities within a political system’. Similarly, Pelling and Dill (2006: 4) explain how: ‘The way 
in which the state and other sectors act in response and recovery is largely predicated on the 
kind of political relationships that existed between sectors before the crisis.’ This paper draws 
on the idea of disaster as a lens, and it is in this context that the evidence basis of this paper, 
in the form of survivor narratives, gains particular relevance.  
 
Thirdly, and more fundamentally in forming the paper’s core research agenda, disasters are 
identified as transformative political moments or 'tipping points' (Pelling and Dell 2010). As 
Chhotray (2014) writes, ‘Disasters are key political moments in the life of a society’. Disaster 
politics have a particularly sharp effect on the relationship between state and society, and 
raise fundamental questions about citizenship and state- society relations. As is often cited in 
the case of post-tsunami Aceh (Gaillard et al. 2008), they offer new possibilities for actors to 
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transcend the past, envision ground-realities anew, and forge transformative relationships 
(Kreutz 2012). As Walch (2014) describes, collaborative relief efforts between state and anti-
state insurgent groups occur where there are low levels of hostility and a positive social 
contract of public service provision by the insurgent group. 
 
But this optimistic scenario of conflict transformation through a political unlocking is far from 
common. Disasters serve more frequently to arouse public anger and outrage at the 
inadequacy of government relief efforts, coalescing political mobilisations about the 
incompetence or the politicised distribution of relief. As Olson (2000: 159) points out, natural 
disasters are agenda control and accountability crises for public officials. In other words, they 
can well bring about significant political transformations, but as Nel and Righarts (2008) and 
Brancati (2007) find, this happens not through conflict resolution but through its escalation 
and sharpening. 
 
The East Pakistan cyclone of November 1970, in which several hundred thousand people are 
thought to have been killed, is often taken as an illustrative case in point. Public anger at the 
inaction and apathy of the West Pakistan-dominated government towards the disaster 
played a critical role in deepening the divisions between two wings of the country. It led, in 
just over a year, to the break-up of Pakistan (Sisson and Rose 1991) and the formation of 
Bangladesh out of its Eastern wing. 
 
These far-reaching possibilities have, as a result, led insecure and authoritarian states to view 
natural disasters and the spontaneous forms of non-state collective action which they 
generate as politically subversive. As Pelling and Dill (2006) describe, non-state relief 
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organisations were suppressed and demobilised after the earthquakes in Guatemala (1976), 
Chile (1985), and Turkey (1999). 
 
At the heart of these larger political dynamics which follow natural disasters are the ways in 
which the provision of relief and the identification of blame and failure are established and 
translated through moral-cognitive frameworks. Those who have the capacity and willingness 
visibly to provide relief can gain in legitimacy, gratitude and public standing. The control of 
desperately needed resources also shifts power, and allows patrons to cultivate political 
loyalty, enhance clientelist networks, and gain electoral mileage. At the same time, it also 
does the converse, and delegitimizes those who are seen to be inactive, absent or profiting 
from the misery of others. The political stakes in any disaster are thus high, and can have 
lasting consequences.  
 
This means that conditions of emergency and abject human need are a moment of 
reinvention, in which political success and failure can be forged. These politically pregnant 
possibilities are widely understood and closely observed among political actors in disaster-
struck areas, so that alongside the competition to command and allocate resources is 
another, more frantic competition to shape public perceptions (Tierney and Bevc 2007).  
 
This leads to the fourth point of engagement between disasters and politics: the social 
construction of disasters. Disaster, suffering, rescue, relief and rehabilitation exist not just in 
terms of fixed scientific and statistical realities of ecological change, body counts and 
reconstruction costs, but in terms of processes of meaning-making through which people – 
victims, interlocutors, administrators, relief workers, and even long distance voyeurs – grasp 
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and come to terms with an event. In divided and contentious political environments such as 
Kashmir, this involves polarised meanings and claims about what really happened, and about 
who the heroes and villains of the disasters were.  
 
Given the role of failed relief in destabilising state-society relationships, there is an important 
fifth arena of research on the politics of disasters which examines the role of the donor, and 
the significance of the donor-recipient relationship. Korf (2007), Korf et al. (2010) and 
Hollenbach and Ruwanpura (2011) highlight the deep ambivalence and problematic nature of 
relief and reconstruction aid. In cases where the gift of aid and differences in power or status 
preclude any possibility of reciprocity, it creates a social debt. Relief and reconstruction aid, 
as unrequited gifts, carry within them the increased standing of the giver, and the deeper 
obligation of the receiver. It means that the recipient acquiesces and accepts his/her inferior 
position in the social hierarchy, and becomes complicit in its reproduction. Rather than 
transcending the past, disasters can perpetuate, reinforce and reproduce it into the future. 
 
This sixth dimension of the politics of disasters thus relates to this issue of relief and 
reconstruction as a nationalist political project. Hasbullah and Korf (2009) describe how the 
reconstruction of Sri Lanka’s east coast after the tsunami involved an intensification of the 
project of ethnic ‘purification’. Simpson and Corbridge (2006) describe how the 
memorialization and reconstruction after the Bhuj earthquake in the Indian state of Gujarat 
was deeply infused by Hindu nationalism. But nationalism operates not just as a political 
project from above: it equally affects the personal ethics and moral framework which guide 
bottom-up volunteerism, as Sabhlok’s (2010) ethnography of aid workers, also in the context 
of Bhuj, explores.  
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3. Fieldwork and Evidence 
The empirical basis of the paper rests primarily on 50 in-depth interviews conducted with 
households of flood victims from some of the main flood-affected districts in the state: 
Kulgam, Pulwama, Anantnag in south Kashmir, Srinagar in the centre, and Baramulla in the 
north. This was complemented with, and triangulated against, a review of documentary 
evidence from local newspaper coverage of the floods, primarily in the English and, to a 
limited extent, in the Urdu press over the period 2–28 September 2014.  
 
FIGURE 1: KASHMIR VALLEY SEPTEMBER 2014. APPROXIMATE EXTENT OF FLOODS AND FIELD 
INTERVIEW SITES 
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Interviews were conducted in October and November 2014, just as flood waters ebbed and 
displaced people were returning from relief camps to their homes. By design, all 50 
households interviewed were Kashmiri Muslims, who constitute an overwhelming 
demographic majority of between 95 to 98 percent across the valley. We sought out research 
sites that stretched across the geographical breadth of the parts of the Kashmir valley which 
had been particularly badly affected by the floods. Households were selected in a non-
random manner through snowballing contact methods to arrive at a purposive sample which 
covered a broad cross-section of society in the valley. The intent in doing so was to capture 
some of the commonalities and differences in narratives across geographical and class 
divides.  
 
The interviewees included relatively wealthy business elites and senior government officials 
in affluent parts of Srinagar, lower middle-class shopkeepers, public sector employees such 
as teachers, and the rural poor, including marginal farmers, half-widows (wives of the 
disappeared), small shopkeepers, and retirees living on basic pensions. Overall, there were 
four interviews from Kulgam, eight from Anantnag, eight from Pulwama, 18 from Srinagar, 
and 12 from Baramulla.  
 
Interviews were mostly in Kashmiri, and were conducted and translated by the authors. The 
interviews consisted of a broad and open-ended series of questions which asked people to 
describe the circumstances of the disaster, the nature of their escape from the floods, the 
identity of those who came to their assistance, the extent of relief, the nature of the losses 
suffered, and their reflections on the role of various actors, from the media to the army. In 
general, people were very willing to respond and spoke at length, often passionately. The 
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stories they narrated were often extraordinary, poignant and at times, disturbing. But they 
were not unusual given the enormity of the tragedy and the hundreds of thousands of people 
who were affected.  
 
This empirical exercise among flood survivors is significant for its originality and depth as well 
as for its timing. It provides fresh insights into the disaster from the point of view of its 
survivors at a time when they were still absorbing and coming to terms with the magnitude 
of the tragedy and its consequences. It brings their experiences, reflections and frustrations 
to light, in their own words and through the lens of their own subjectivities. At the same 
time, these same factors also pose research limitations which should be acknowledged. Due 
to the complicated circumstances in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, there were 
practical difficulties in conducting the fieldwork, in selecting and crafting an optimal sample, 
and in interpreting the findings.  
 
Many residences in the surveyed areas were still unoccupied or were badly damaged and left 
abandoned, so the sample was restricted to those households who had returned, were 
physically present, and were willing to be interviewed at the time of the visit. In addition, a 
familiar set of issues arose regarding the use of the household as the unit of analysis and the 
identity of the actual respondent within the household. The 50 respondents comprised 13 
women and 37 men. This gender disproportionality was not a conscious decision and was 
difficult to predict, control or mitigate. This was not just because it was subject to the 
availability of household members at the time of the interview, but also because the 
composition of many households had recently changed due to the death, displacement and 
temporary relocation of family members during the floods. 
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Finally, the type of fieldwork described here – with qualitative interviews conducted using a 
semi-structured questionnaire, and the possibility of free-flowing responses – had its 
strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it allowed for nuance, depth and off-script 
conversations. Respondents could prioritise and emphasise issues of their own concern 
rather than passively providing answers to questions conceived and prioritised by an 
interviewer. This was a critical element of the fieldwork, and a necessary one given the 
nature of the research question at hand. But it also meant that the responses were in 
themselves idiosyncratic and individualized such that they were often not easily amenable to 
drawing out simple inferences from side-by-side comparison. The work of analyzing the 
interviews thus involved the clustering and reconstruction of important narratives, rather 
than the tabulation of standardized data.  
 
There was a convergence of a number of important narratives in the interviews, which are 
expanded on below in five broad clusters. These are: (i) the suddenness of the disaster, the 
lack of warning, and the unpreparedness for its extent; (ii) the paralysis and absence of the 
state; (iii) the role of local youth, voluntary organisations and local social networks; (iv) 
unfairness in rescue, relief provision and prioritization; and (v) anger at national media 
coverage of the floods. The rest of the paper expands on these five clusters, situates them 
within their context, and concludes with a discussion which engages with the political 
repercussions of the floods and the broader study of the politics of disasters.  
 
4. Context 
 
 
14 
It looked like doomsday. God should never show that 
day again. In the 51 years of my life I have never seen 
water being so angry it just wanted to take away what 
ever came on its way. (Interview 43, Kulgam, 11 July 
2014) 
 
From 2-6 September 2014, heavy monsoon rains occurred across the Kashmir valley, 
triggering landslides and flooding across the state. In particular, an arc of heavy rain hit the 
southern part of the valley and the adjoining hill districts of Poonch, Rajouri, Reasi and 
Ramban amounting to as much as 10 times the normal rainfall in that period. By 3 
September, the water level at the Sangam bridge near Bijbehara had crossed the danger 
mark as the main southern tributaries of the Jhelum – the Rembiara, Vishaw, Brengi, Kuthar 
and Sandran – had already risen high enough to flood parts of the valley.  
 
Heavy rains continued until 6 September and flood water peaked on 8 September, receding 
and draining slowly over the next three weeks. In the valley, a total 557 km2 of land was 
inundated, directly affecting villages and towns occupied by two million people, or almost 40 
percent of the total population of the valley. In total, 268 people died as a result of the 
floods. In the affected parts of the Kashmir valley, which is the focus of this study, there were 
relatively fewer deaths compared to Poonch, Rajauri and Reasi in Jammu district, which 
suffered serious landslides and flash flooding. But as the economic and administrative hub of 
the state, with the bulk of its population, the impact was far greater in the valley in terms of 
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the number of people displaced, houses damaged, crops destroyed, and productive 
enterprises lost.  
 
In the rural areas of south Kashmir, entire villages and thousands of acres of farmlands were 
submerged. In some villages, virtually every house and structure had crumbled in the torrent, 
leaving very little behind. The rural economy suffered heavily with the saffron and apple 
crops bearing estimated losses of Rs 700 Cr and Rs 1000 Cr, respectively (USD 100 million and 
USD 150 million), (Yasir 2014b, Assocham 2014).  In the capital Srinagar alone, some 73,000 
houses were damaged or destroyed, as many parts of the city remained under 14 feet of 
water for days. People in the flooded areas were either forced to flee their homes in the face 
of a rising current, or else were stranded awaiting rescue, without food, water or 
communication for days.  
 
Most people remained displaced or in distressed conditions for the next three weeks, and it 
was only on 1 October that water levels receded to the point where occupants were able to 
return and inspect the damage. At the time of the interviews, which took place in October-
November, flood waters had receded entirely, but large numbers of flood victims remained 
in acute distress, struggling to confront the enormity of the financial and human loss they 
had suffered. As a young man from Srinagar described, ‘The mental trauma, the stress that 
we have suffered cannot be conveyed’ (Interview 11, Srinagar, 15 October 2014). 
 
The geography and ecology of the Kashmir valley have rendered it prone to periodic flooding 
by the River Jhelum and its tributaries historically (Koul 1978; Singh and Kumar 2013). In 
recent years, Kashmir experienced floods in 1992, 1996 and 2006. Historical sources on 
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Kashmir from the earliest kingdoms to the Mughal and Afghan periods include numerous 
accounts of flooding and its effects on the valley (Kaw 1996). Sir Walter Roper Lawrence’s 
classic travelogue from 1895, The Valley of Kashmir, also mentions the many disastrous 
floods he encountered in vernacular histories, including the terrible inundation of 879 A.D. 
He himself experienced the floods of 1893 and wrote of its terrible cost: ‘In 1893 the floods 
cost the State Rs 64,802 in land revenue alone, 25,426 acres under crops were submerged, 
2,225 houses were wrecked and 329 cattle killed (Lawrence 1895: 207).  
 
This natural predisposition of the Kashmir valley to periodic floods notwithstanding, disasters 
are more than just natural phenomena and are profoundly shaped by the human 
environment, both in terms of causation and impact. As Wisner et al. (2004: 4-5) note, 
disasters are also the product of social, political and economic environments:  
These involve the manner in which assets income and access to other resources such 
as knowledge and information are distributed between different social groups, and 
various forms of discrimination that occur in the allocation of welfare and social 
protection (including relief and resources for recovery). 
 
As with many other heavily populated, flood-prone Himalayan areas, the ecological and 
geographical vulnerability of the valley to floods has been aggravated by recent 
anthropogenic causes which have increased its intensity and impact. Aside from global-level 
concerns about climate change, local factors have to do with changes in land-use patterns 
such as increased construction on the floodplain, deforestation in upper catchment areas, 
the shrinkage of wetlands in lower areas, and poor flood management. These changing land-
use patterns are closely interwoven with economic, social and political trajectories, so that 
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any account of the Kashmir floods must necessarily take these factors into account not just in 
its consequences, but also in its causation.  
 
5. Narratives of Disaster Survivors 
My son had not even put on his slippers.  
(Interview 35, Kulgam, 20 October 2014) 
 
Despite the long history of flooding, and the particular vulnerability of the valley, the 2014 
floods were remarkable for their magnitude and breadth of damage. In a short space of time, 
a large part of the population suddenly lost their homes, all their personal possessions, 
livestock, crops, tools, economic assets and important documents. People recounted ‘a 
catastrophe never seen before’ (Interview 35, Kulgam, 20 October 2014). A young man in 
Srinagar said, ‘I literally don’t have words to describe that disaster of nature’ (Interview 6, 
Srinagar, 7 October 2014). It was ‘the worst thing that has ever happened to us…we lost 
everything’ (Interview 36, Srinagar, 5 November 2014). Others talked of how, once they had 
reached safety, they watched from a distance in distress as their houses were gradually 
inundated and then collapsed. 
 
What also stands out about the Kashmir floods of 2014 is the lack of an early warning system, 
the extent of unpreparedness for the disaster, and the surprise with which people were 
consequently forced to confront it. Most people remained in their homes until the very last 
minute as waters rose, by which time they were either trapped inside, or else were forced to 
escape because their homes were collapsing. The lack of advance warning or timely 
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evacuation has had a clear impact on the extent of human suffering and economic loss which 
resulted.  
 
Surprise, Loss and Evacuation 
Unlike the flash floods and landslides of the adjoining mountainous parts of Rajouri or 
Poonch, which took place without much warning on the first two days, the floods in the 
valley spread relatively slowly from south to north. The high flood waters of the Jhelum and 
its tributaries took five days to make the 120-kilometre journey from south to north: 
Pulwama was submerged on Wednesday 3 September, Anantnag on 5 September, Srinagar 
on 6 September, and Baramulla on 9 September. Yet it took the authorities and people of 
each newly flooded area by surprise.  
 
On 3 September, a farmer from Kulgam recounted, ‘When we woke up there was water all 
around…we were not expecting such large scale damage’ (Interview 43, Kulgam, 7 November 
2014). Two days later, when Anantnag, some 20 kilometres away, was flooded, a 
businessman described how it ‘caught people unaware’ (Interview 41, Anantnag, 21 
November 2014). Four days after this, and just 80 kilometres away when the floods reached 
Pattan, a family of carpet weavers similarly recounted their shock at how ‘water burst into 
the house all of a sudden at 5am’ (Interview 24, Pattan, 17 October 2014). 
 
In the rural areas of Kulgam, Anantnag and Pulwama districts, which were affected in the first 
two days, large areas of agricultural lands were flooded, and people fled homes and villages 
on foot because their houses were destroyed by the height and force of the current. In 
Srinagar, where better-built two- or three-storey concrete houses were able to withstand the 
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floods, most people found themselves trapped on the second floor or roof of their houses. 
Virtually all of the households interviewed in the affected parts of Srinagar spent between 
three days to two weeks trapped in their houses with little water or food. 
 
As a result of the lack of warning or early evacuation, people responded only at the very last 
minute, under emergency conditions, often in the middle of the night. In Srinagar, there was 
a very sudden escalation of water levels in the early hours of 7 September, trapping a large 
portion of the one million residents of the city inside their houses. A family from Indra Nagar 
described how a 12-foot high tide of water first entered their house at 4am, after which ‘in 
seven minutes the ground floor was inundated’ (Interview 1, Srinagar, 7 October 2014). 
Another household in Bemina described: ‘Our ground floor got inundated in just half an hour’ 
(Interview 10, Srinagar, 15 October 2014). 
 
This surprise element of the floods, which was a recurrent narrative in the interviews, had 
three serious consequences. Firstly, the lack of preparedness resulted in enormous, and to 
some extent preventable, financial loss. Although much of the damage, particularly to 
agricultural crops and houses, could not have been prevented even with early warning, the 
loss of movable equipment, tools, raw materials and finished goods suffered by businessmen, 
shopkeepers and artisans as well as a great deal of personal property and household 
possessions could well have been better managed.  
 
The floods also occurred during the traditional wedding season in Kashmir (Yousuf 2014a), as 
a result of which there was one widely reported tragedy where an entire wedding bus party 
of 50 people were washed away and killed in the hill district of Rajouri (Shah 2014). Beyond 
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this, it also meant that many families lost large amounts of expensive ceremonial material, 
often amounting to several hundred thousand rupees, such as clothes and jewellery which 
had been stored in their homes. A barber from Kulgam described: ‘My daughter was getting 
married next month all the preparation had been completed. All those objects were washed 
away in front of my eyes’ (Interview 43, Kulgam, 7 November 2014). 
 
Secondly, it meant that families with elderly or infirm members with medical conditions had 
great difficulty in escaping the floods, in getting evacuated, or in accessing regular 
medication. A shopkeeper from Kursoo Rajbagh in Srinagar described: ‘My father is blind, we 
had great difficulty in evacuating him’ (Interview 4, Srinagar, 7 October 2014). A school 
teacher from Pulwama explained that ‘my father is paralyzed since last nine years. [He] 
couldn’t take medicines for many days because all the medicines were washed away and 
they were not able to buy new medicines’ (Interview 17, Pulwama, 10 October 2014). Other 
respondents described similar problems of elderly heart patients and diabetics suffering 
without medication for days (Interview 8, Srinagar, 24 October 2014 and Interview 9, 
Srinagar, 13 October 2014). 
 
Thirdly, many families became separated in the circumstances, and, due to the collapse of 
cellular telephone networks, remained without contact with one another for days or weeks. 
A middle-class family from Srinagar described: ‘We were out of touch from my father and 
brother and it was only after a month that we were able to contact each other' (Interview 27, 
Srinagar, 5 November 2014) . A half-widow who lost contact with her son for 11 days spoke 
of this and described: ‘Later we found him in a different camp… I do not know how we 
managed to spend those days without him’ (Interview 2, Srinagar, 10 December 2014). 
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Overall, seven of the 50 families interviewed, predominantly from urban Srinagar, lost 
contact with one or more household member for an extended period. 
 
State Failure 
The government did not offer any help neither for 
rescuing us nor for the relief distribution. (Interview 
44, Anantnag, 7 November 2014). 
 
Closely related to the lack of warning and preparation was a second narrative about the 
widespread collapse of all branches of the administration during the first two weeks of the 
flood. Across socio-economic status and geographical location, there was an overwhelming 
consensus about the absence and incompetence of the state. This was to some extent what 
people expected, and the responses reflect pre-existing attitudes borne out of experience 
and  reproduced anew here with fresh evidence.  
 
As the then chief minister Omar Abdullah himself conceded in a television interview: ‘I had 
no government... My secretariat, the police headquarters, the control room, fire services, 
hospitals, all the infrastructure was under water’ (Ghosh 2014, Yasir 2014a.  Indeed, large 
numbers of politicians, bureaucrats and police were themselves trapped and in desperate 
circumstances. Many army camps, including Srinagar’s Badami Bagh cantonment, were also 
heavily flooded, leading to an unusual absence of the normally heavy presence of security 
forces from the valley. A businessman from Anantnag described: ‘there was no government 
agency active in the town for the first 15 days’ (Interview 41, Anantnag, 21 November 2014). 
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A young, middle-class man from Srinagar explained:  
Police, army and central as well as state government was missing from the scene. The 
role they played during the whole scene was dismal and unexpected. The most 
unfortunate thing was that the army for the first four or five days instead of rescuing 
the common people was busy evacuating their own men and left the people in utter 
deluge. (Interview 7, Srinagar, 15 October 2014) 
 
An agricultural labourer from Tral who lost his house made a similar observation: ‘State 
government was itself helpless, central government reacted late, state police was not visible, 
army was trying to appease people with little help’ (Interview 47, Pulwama, 23 October 
2014).  
 
Other respondents did note the presence and the role of the army, and to a lesser extent, the 
National Disaster Relief Force (NDRF) who were active in particular areas such as Srinagar’s 
Shivpora, Rambagh and Indra Nagar. There was, however, no such appreciation extended to 
the state government from any of the respondents. Despite the personal efforts and 
frequent public appearances of the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah on the ground and on 
television, there was widespread criticism of the political, administrative and law 
enforcement machinery. 
 
A farmer from the village of Beighpora described how ‘the state government was almost 
missing in action, as if it did not exist’ (Interview 16, Pulwama, 10 October 2014). A young 
woman from Anantnag whose father died of a heart attack while they were trapped and 
awaiting rescue spoke of how ‘the government machinery was defunct in rescuing people. 
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Those who were rescued were left at the mercy of god’ (Interview 44, Anantnag, 7 November 
2014). A small shopkeeper from Kulgam noted that ‘state government was not active at all 
during this period of despair’ (Interview 45, Kulgam, 8 November 2014).  
 
Urban, middle-class respondents from Srinagar, many of whom were themselves well-
connected and from families of senior civil servants, were equally critical of the government. 
They described: ‘We saw no one from the State or Central Government’ (Interview 3, 
Srinagar, 12 October 2014); ‘I didn’t see even a single government official in our area during 
or after the floods. Even our MLA is yet to pay us a visit’ (Interview 10, Srinagar, 15 October 
2014); ‘There was no sign of any government agency or any other government personnel 
being available for help. The government was missing and defunct’ (Interview 1, Srinagar, 7 
October 2014); and ‘The government even failed to clean our link roads. The trash and 
residue was cleared a month later on the eve of Eid’ (Interview 11, Srinagar, 15 October 
2014).  
 
Military versus Local Youth 
With the effective collapse of the state government and administration during the first few 
days of the flood, how then did hundreds of thousands of trapped people in the valley get 
rescued and find relief? The Indian national media's coverage emphasised and projected the 
role of the large Indian military presence in the state. In the days after the floods, Indian 
television viewers saw vivid images of trapped civilians being rescued and air-lifted to safety 
in large coordinated missions (Operation Megh Rahat and Operation Sadbhavna) by army and 
air force personnel, as well as by the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF).  Official press 
releases describe over 200,000 people rescued by the armed forces, and indeed, flood 
 
 
24 
victims mentioned this. A middle-class woman from Kulgam described: ‘People were rescued 
by locals and army without any bias…army also provided some food and blankets’ (Interview 
45, Kulgam, 11 August 2014). In Rambagh, Srinagar, we heard: ‘Most of the families in our 
area were evacuated by the NDRF teams’ (Interview 8, Srinagar, 24 October 2014); and in 
Indra Nagar ‘We were rescued by the army… The rescue in our area was mainly done by 
army, NDRF and JK Police’ (Interview 37, Srinagar, 5 November 2014).  
 
But while the Indian army may well have played an important role, the interviewees, as well 
as a considerable body of evidence from media, NGO and other observers, suggest that the 
role of the army was in reality limited in relation to the vast scale of the problem at hand. In 
contrast, a far greater number, amounting to the large majority of affected people, appear to 
have been assisted by impromptu groups of local volunteers, a fact which was widely 
described in the local media but rarely in the national media. A young woman from Srinagar 
stated: ‘I think I saw only one institution at work during the floods and that was the local 
volunteers. No one else in my eyes has done anything’ (Interview 9, Srinagar, 13 October 
2014). 
 
Another young woman from Srinagar captured the broad sentiment on this issue: 
Media manufactured the truth about the floods and portrayed as if everything was 
army. We are not denying [or saying] that army didn’t do anything but they were not 
the only people who did everything. (Interview 3, Srinagar, 12 October 2014) 
 
Of our limited sample of 50 households, 27 left their houses and escaped the floods by 
themselves, and 5 stayed at home. Of the remaining 18 households who were actually 
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rescued by others, 14 of these rescues were attributed to local volunteers. Of the remaining 
four, only one family reported being rescued by the army, and one other by the NDRF, while 
the remaining two were rescued by their relatives.  
 
This confirms a wide body of anecdotal evidence, as well as the findings of an earlier study on 
the floods by a group of student volunteers which found that 96% of people in shelters 
reported being rescued by local volunteers (Rapid Assessment People’s Report 2014). Local 
media reports from the Kashmir valley-based media in the aftermath of the floods provide 
sporadic and episodic evidence of this phenomenon. One report described how a group of 
300 youth rescued 20,000 people (Rising Kashmir 2014b). Another report highlights the role 
of a group of young volunteers who rescued 1,500 villagers (Rising Kashmir 2014c).  
 
The role of local volunteers in Kashmir was acknowledged even within the hierarchy of the 
Indian army, even while the Indian media obscured it. As the northern army commander 
General D.S. Hooda noted: 
The task in Srinagar was too enormous and whatever the relief agencies (army, air 
force NDRF) could do would still not be enough. This is where we have to 
acknowledge the efforts of local volunteers who have contributed immensely. (Ashraf 
2014) 
 
There is only anecdotal information available about the identity and organizational networks 
behind the numerous volunteer groups credited with most of the relief work. For the most 
part, they appear to be highly localized, fragmented and impromptu collectives of young 
males who formed and dispersed spontaneously. Their effectiveness came from a 
 
 
26 
combination of localised knowledge, personal links and high levels of commitment. But 
beyond the realities of their effectiveness, the identification and attribution of credit to the 
local Kashmiri youth volunteers compared to the Indian military is significant and has 
meaning in itself, and requires some expansion.  In the deeply divided, insurgency-prone 
political landscape of Kashmir, these two categories of relief workers correspond in other 
circumstances to the opposing camps of protagonists who confront one another in the 
everyday business of conflict. Young Kashmiri males have been at the centre of armed 
militancy against the state since 1990, and continue to be subject to heightened levels of 
scrutiny and surveillance. The archetypal ‘angry young man’ of Kashmir has emerged as the 
iconic image of popular resistance against the Indian security forces, most recently in a 
summer of stone-pelting against the security forces which erupted sporadically across the 
cities and towns of the valley in 2010. In the light of this, it was striking how respondents in 
our study across class, geographical and educational divides in the valley unanimously 
identified the ubiquitous ‘youth volunteers’ as responsible for their safe evacuation, often 
contrasting their effectiveness with the ineffectiveness of the state administration and 
security forces.  
 
In the villages of south Kashmir, people described how ‘everyone in our locality was rescued 
by local volunteers and villagers who carried old aged people on their shoulders’ (Interview 
19, Bijbehara, 10 November 2014). In the nearby village of Batengoo: ‘All the people were 
rescued by local people in small makeshift boats. There was no one else to help except these 
boys (Interview 44, Batengoo, 7 November 2014). A barber from Kulgam who lost his house 
similarly recounted how ‘nobody visited our village during the times of flood. Only local 
people helped each other (Interview 43, Kulgam, 7 November 2014). Even in the very 
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different world of urban, educated, middle-class respondents from the affluent suburbs of 
Srinagar, the message was strikingly similar and uniform: ‘Had the local Kashmiri volunteers 
not helped, people would have died like animals’ (Interview 1, Srinagar, 7 October 2014).   
 
A milk shop owner from Srinagar who lost his livelihood in the floods explained:  
All the family members were rescued by local volunteers from the old town. And 
these are the same boys whom the police calls stone-pelters. I think had these boys 
not come with these hand-made boats we all would have died slowly in our homes 
without food and water. (Interview 12, Srinagar, 9 October 2014) 
 
Local volunteer groups were also widely credited as the most active in organizing relief and 
assistance to the large numbers of displaced people: ‘The local volunteers from the old town 
did a tremendous job in arranging food and accommodation for people’ (Interview 4, 
Srinagar, 7 October 2014). Several respondents, particularly in Srinagar, noted the role of 
activists from the separatist Hurriyat coalition, and particularly the woman’s organization 
Dukhtaran-e-Millat in providing relief to affected families.   
 
While many respondents described rescue-and-relief efforts by the army, NDRF, NGOs such 
as Oxfam, Save the Children and Action Aid, and voluntary donations from other parts of 
India, there was an unmistakable emphasis on and affection for local efforts over the national 
or the international. Alongside the local youth and Hurriyat activists, Kashmiri narratives of 
the flood recalled local philanthropic donations, town organisations, or trusts such as the 
Yateem Trust or Agha Syed Yousuf Memorial Trust. Several respondents noted the role of 
Kashmiri student organisations in Delhi and elsewhere in India. A middle-aged labourer from 
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Srinagar who had lost his ancestral property and all his documents reported that ‘People had 
come from far-off districts like Baramulla, Ganderbal and Badipora to help others in the time 
of need. People brought boats, food, and utensils and bedding. Kashmir has never seen this 
kind of volunteerism. (Interview 15, Srinagar, 9 October 2014) 
 
This is not to suggest that the Indian army was inactive after the floods, but rather that its 
role requires a more nuanced explanation. The only account available of the role of the 
Indian army during the floods is from an academic researcher who had the opportunity to 
interact and observe the army at close quarters. Vasundhara Sirinate describes how the army 
had indeed been very active in the first few days of the floods, but then stopped after rescue 
teams were pelted with stones: 
The 162nd Battalion was instrumental in much of the rescue effort, but all of it lasted 
barely nine days. After incidents of stone-pelting were reported, the rescue boats 
were stopped. Officers and soldiers did work long hours not only rescuing people but 
also sheltering them…Then the stone-pelting incidents happened, for reasons that lie 
at an intersection of politics and resistance, and the equation changed. (Sirnate 2014) 
  
Bias in Rescue and Relief 
The priority was first the politicians, then the 
bureaucrats, then the non-locals and the number of 
the common men came last in the last. [Interview 6, 
Srinagar, 7 October 2014). 
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The contentious politics of disaster relief revolves heavily around perceptions of unequal 
treatment and unfairness in rescue and relief provision. Victims of the Kashmir flood spoke of 
a number of complaints of unfair treatment, although it must be said that overall this was an 
issue emphasized by a minority, and most respondents either did not speak of this issue or 
did not find there was any unfair treatment. Indeed, people were more disturbed by the 
incompetence and inadequacy of the government rather than by any bias. However, those 
who articulated their sense of bias in relief provision fell within two distinct types, which to 
some extent contradicted one another. 
 
Firstly, a number of respondents from the villages of south Kashmir complained that media 
attention, relief and rehabilitation assistance were being targeted to the urban, wealthier 
residents of Srinagar. A disabled man from a village in Anantnag who suffered the collapse of 
this house in the floods explained: 
They only concentrated on the city without realizing that people also lived in villages, 
and they were also stranded, too. There should have been efforts to save all the 
people of Kashmir not just people in Srinagar. (Interview 23, Arweni, 13 October 
2014.)  
 
A farmer from Dangerpora in Pulwama, whose village was completely submerged, similarly 
said:  
All the relief material which came from outside was given to the people in Srinagar 
city. In villages people only got help from nearby villages. Majority of the parts from 
south Kashmir were flooded but those areas where flood had not come helped. 
(Interview 17, Dangerpora, 10 October 2014) 
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Others in south Kashmir attributed the problem variously to the concentration of national 
media attention, as well as of army and NDRF deployment in Srinagar (Interview 41, 
Anantnag, 21 November 2014 and Interview 22, Bijbehara, 11 October 2014). 
 
However, in Srinagar itself, respondents were oblivious to this issue, and instead complained 
of a different kind of bias they perceived directed towards tourists and influential people. A 
city businessman charged that ‘the priority was first the politicians, then the bureaucrats, 
then the non-locals, and the number of the common man came in the last. (Interview 6, 
Srinagar, 7 October 2014). Another respondent spoke bitterly of how ‘high level government 
officials, political affiliates, security and defense personnel as well as the tourists and 
outsiders were the prime priority of the rescuers all the time. We were left to fend for 
ourselves (Interview 36, Srinagar, 5 November 2014).  
 
These accusations became widespread during the floods, and the army commander General 
D.S. Hooda countered them publicly by arguing that a large part of the army personnel in 
charge of rescue and relief in Srinagar were Kashmiri themselves. ‘Could we have issued 
orders to them to save non-Kashmiris first?’ (Ashraf 2014). At any rate, given the magnitude 
of the disaster, and the admittedly modest role played by the army under those 
circumstances, it would seem reasonable to suggest that even if such bias did exist it would in 
itself not have affected the outcomes for the majority of people. The perception remains, 
however, among a sizeable minority; as one respondent put it: ‘The influential people, elite 
class and outsiders were prioritized on every front’ (Interview 7, Srinagar, 15 October 2014).  
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Media Accounts 
Aside from the lack of preparation, collapse of the state administration, and the role of local 
volunteers, the fourth major narrative to emerge among flood victims was the role of the 
media. As with other recent disasters in India, such as the 2013 Uttarakhand floods or 
Cyclone Phailin in Odisha, television journalism played an essential role in broadcasting the 
gravity of the disaster and  the extent of human suffering to a nation-wide audience, helping 
to mobilise awareness, support and assistance. By holding a critical lens to the role of 
government agencies in the relief efforts, the media has also enhanced the transparency and 
accountability of these institutions in situations of abject crisis. Much the same happened in 
Kashmir, as national television crews conveyed the distant suffering of people in a peripheral, 
conflict-torn, mountainous region, to the country at large. 
 
However, interviewees in Kashmir itself drew a sharp distinction between the role of the local 
versus national media. People spoke positively about the role of local Kashmir-based 
journalists, many of whom were themselves victims of the disaster and were working under 
conditions of considerable personal distress and adversity: 
Media played a very positive role during the floods. It was they who kept tracking the 
developments and helped the government and volunteers steer their operations. 
There were many instances wherein the media personnel left their work aside and 
joined hands with the volunteers for the help of people. (Interview 7, Srinagar, 15 
October 2014) 
 
This was markedly different from perceptions of the national New Delhi-based media. There 
are of course wide differences in reporting among the range of different television, print, and 
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electronic media outlets, but most respondents remembered and spoke largely of what they 
found was the most objectionable and offensive. Often carried into the disaster sites in army 
or air force transportation, the national media reported widely on the disaster and helped 
mobilise awareness and relief aid from around India. But they also tended to emphasize the 
positive contribution of the Indian military within which they were embedded. New Delhi-
based journalists who flew in to report on the disaster transmitted vivid footage and first-
hand accounts of the disaster, and also of the rescue of Kashmiri civilians by Indian soldiers.  
 
The significance of this coverage became apparent in two ways. Firstly, national journalists 
who reported on the disaster and the role of the Indian military found it impossible to report 
the flood without reference to its potential political implications. In the voice-overs behind 
the live coverage, and in the evening news discussion programmes which followed, it was this 
larger political issue which the debates centred around. Would this humanitarian effort by 
the Indian military, the journalists asked, not positively transform the hitherto fraught 
relationship between the military and civilian population? 
 
Secondly, positive footage of the Indian military shown by the national media contrasted with 
conspicuously negative coverage of the Kashmir valley’s separatist political leaders, who were 
often portrayed either as impotent demagogues, or as cunning opportunists seeking to 
capitalize upon and gain false credit from the disaster.  
 
Yasin Malik, leader of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and one of the most 
prominent separatist leaders in the valley, was at one point charged by Indian national 
television news stations with hijacking a relief boat in order to be seen to distribute  the relief 
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himself. Iftikhar Gilani, a senior Delhi-based Kashmiri journalist, revealed how he was asked 
to participate in this: 
I got a call from a news channel wanting me to arrange visuals of the JKLF chairman 
Mohammad Yasin Malik rescued by the Army… It was of course another matter that 
Malik was sitting at his Maisuma home, and the tourists and labourers stranded in Lal 
Chowk were telling journalists that Malik was the only person who for seven days 
reached them with water and biscuits. (Gilani 2014) 
 
Indeed, the national media coverage of the disaster has, after the failures of the Jammu and 
Kashmir state administration, become the most important focal point for public anger and 
resentment after the floods. As this young man from a middle-class family in Indra Nagar, 
Srinagar described:  
Media manipulated things and fabricated the truth to show army in good light. But no 
reporter wanted to wet his feet in water to show the cruel reality – and that reality 
was that the army failed, the system failed. I am not saying that army did nothing, but 
it did not do what was being reported on TV. (Interview 1, Srinagar, 7 October 2014) 
 
A respondent from the south Kashmir town of Anantnag dwelt on this this at length: 
The media was showing repeatedly pictures of soldiers carrying people out of their 
homes… Tell me, can 70 helicopters can save two lakh [two hundred thousand] 
people? It was complete misrepresentation of facts… I am not saying army did 
nothing. NDRF and army – they did a great job. But what was the need to show? What 
was the need to take camera-persons with you to helicopters. (Interview 41, 
Anantnag, 21 November 2014)  
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Largely as a result of national media coverage, the abiding image of the 2014 floods which 
the rest of India outside Kashmir has been left with is one of Indian army soldiers rescuing 
desperate, but ultimately ungrateful, Kashmiri civilians. In contrast, the abiding impression 
that Kashmiris were left with is of a prejudiced Indian media which exploited a tragedy and 
misrepresented the reality in order to promote a positive image for the Indian army.  
 
6. Conclusions: The Politics of Flood Disaster in Kashmir 
There are six broad issues we distilled from the narratives of flood survivors. Firstly, despite 
the historical vulnerability of the Kashmir valley to floods, there was poor disaster planning or 
preparedness. Secondly, the state administration was revealed to be incompetent in 
preparing or responding effectively to the crisis. Thirdly, the narratives of relief and 
attribution of assistance were sharply divided along lines which corresponded to prior 
individual political sympathies. While Kashmiri flood victims tended to credit local volunteers, 
the Indian media largely credited the Indian military. Fourthly, the overwhelming majority of 
people appear to have been rescued by local volunteers, suggesting that the role of the 
Indian military was modest. Fifthly, people outside Srinagar felt that relief and media 
attention was unfairly directed at the capital, while people in Srinagar itself felt that tourists 
and VIPs were prioritized. Sixthly, Kashmiris deeply resented the way that the floods were 
presented on national television media, and viewed it as exploitative and distorted. The 
Indian media's coverage of the role of the military, in turn, created the impression elsewhere 
in India that Kashmiris were, despite having been rescued and cared for by the military, 
ungrateful for this. 
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What then can be said about the question posed at the beginning of this paper? Did the 
floods in Kashmir result in a politically transformative moment? What evidence is there to 
support this idea from the narratives of its survivors?  
 
In Kashmir, as in other such cases, the disaster created a brief moment in which established 
relationships, hierarchies, rivalries and patterns of life were temporarily suspended, shaken 
and disturbed. Indeed, all the main actors involved – the army, state government, national 
government, state and national media, pro-independence politicians, local and national 
volunteer organizations, NGOs and Kashmiri civilians – already had long histories of 
interaction but were, because of the circumstances, forced to relate to and consider one 
another in different ways.  
 
Within the first few days of the floods in Kashmir, there were already competing and 
confusing claims about who was responsible for the tragedy, and who was directing rescue 
operations and providing relief. There were widespread complaints on the ground that the 
state government was ineffective and absent. The media, particularly the New Delhi-based 
national media, tended to emphasis the positive role of the Indian armed forces and to 
suggest that this had transformed the army’s relationship with the Kashmiri people. Interview 
responses instead suggested that local volunteers played a much more important role, and 
that the floods had if anything reinforced the mistrust and bitterness among the public 
towards the state apparatus.  
 
In the weeks after the flood in October and November 2014, mounting public anger at the 
state government and its manifold failures took the form of numerous localised 
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demonstrations across the valley, often with very specific demands.1 In elections to the state 
legislature, which were held on schedule just three months after the floods in December 
2014, the ruling government of Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and his National Conference 
party lost power. The National Conference, which  dominated state politics for the last six 
decades, was relegated to a distant third position. In other words, the political heat 
generated by the flood probably carried some impact on the election results. To this extent, 
the floods can be said to have constituted a tipping point of sorts, in which public anger 
catalyzed regime change. 
 
But this in itself was far from a transformative outcome. Legislative re-balancing and the 
change of the state government in Jammu and Kashmir have limited importance given the 
scale of the larger unresolved issues and the dispute at hand. Alongside the ambivalence 
which Kashmiris hold towards their incorporation into India is a deep cynicism towards 
federated electoral democracy as an instrument of Indian rule. The real tipping point in 
contemporary Kashmiri political history occurred in the late 1980s, with the explosive 
outburst of a mass movement which rejected federalism within India in favour of separatism 
and radical insurgent militancy. In 2014, Kashmir was in a period of de-radicalization, still 
recovering from the extraordinarily traumatic consequences of militancy and the counter-
insurgency. 
 
While it would thus be premature to draw far-reaching conclusions, and bearing in mind the 
limitations of the evidence at hand, the simple answer to the question we posed is that the 
direct political consequences were limited. The floods served neither to catalyse radical 
                                                        
1
 See, for example, these reports during and after the floods: Rising Kashmir (2014a), and Yousuf (2014b). 
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change, nor did it unlock a transformative potential among the conflicting parties. Both were, 
in any event, unlikely outcomes. This is not to suggest that there are no political 
consequences of the floods – but, perhaps, that they operated in a more diffuse manner, 
through different channels.  
 
For example, the floods provided revealing insights which were politically significant in 
themselves. The spontaneous rise of voluntarism, the dysfunctionalities of the state, the 
hypocrisy of the powerful, and the opportunism of politicians were all briefly and viscerally 
evident in their nakedness under emergency conditions. They served to provide Kashmiris 
with further evidence to confirm three widely held beliefs. Firstly, they provided evidence 
that the state government is ineffective and that the central government does not prioritise 
them. Secondly, it confirmed widely held perceptions that the Indian media is hostile to 
them, that it willfully distorts the reality of what happens in Kashmir. Thirdly, it reinforced the 
belief that their safety and well-being rests within elements of Kashmiri society itself, to 
whom they owe their lives and wellbeing. In their hour of need, Kashmiri society found and 
chose to remember that it was provided for largely by itself: by the public-spiritedness of 
young men, and by the generosity and benevolence of local philanthropy.  
 
This answer from a farm labourer in Pulwama summarized what many felt that they had 
learned: 
The real face of the institutions came to the surface during the floods. The state 
government remained a mute spectator. It seemed as if they had no clue what to do. 
The national media used the floods as a platform to paint the Indian army as the 
saviour of the general public. The army was actually busy in rescuing the non-locals 
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and tourists, but Radio Kashmir Srinagar played an anchor role in connecting people. 
The police appeared on the scene only when the dust had settled. (Interview 49, 
Aghanzpora, 23 October 2014) 
 
The absence of an apparent ‘tipping point’ also points to the need to reformulate the 
relationship between natural disaster and political transformation in a different way, in order 
to see how it fits within the evidence in this case. The issue here is the way that different 
elements in the national and regional political constellations entered into a desperate 
competition to gain favourable media coverage, fashion public opinion, and construct 
narratives which would shape the historical memory of the event. Herein lies the possibility 
of a more productive approach to understanding the politics of natural disasters as they 
unfold.  
  
Within the valley, numerous political actors sought to frame the disaster in terms of their 
own political compulsions. The parliamentary opposition parties in the state, the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), were sharply critical of the 
failures of the National Conference (NC) led government of Chief Minister Omar Abdullah. 
The separatist leaders of the Hurriyat Conference, Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Umar 
Farooq, made a number of public statements criticising the Indian government for its lack of 
interest in the floods, its prioritization of tourists and senior politicians in rescue missions, 
and the refusal to allow international humanitarian aid. The Pakistan-based chief of the 
United Jihad Council (UJC), Syed Salahuddin, while criticizing the role of the Indian 
government, also announced a suspension of militant operations in sympathy with the 
affected people of Kashmir (Rising Kashmir 2014d).. 
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In other words, what is perhaps more important than the measurable political outcomes due 
to the flood is the way that many actors, including the national media, expected that it would 
be politically significant and transformative. As a result, they sought to gain from it, to enact 
meaningful political performances to be recorded for posterity, and to extract political 
impact from their actions. 
 
Media coverage from New Delhi dwelt at length not just on visual images of the army’s relief 
efforts, but also with follow-up evening panel discussion programmes dedicated entirely to 
debating whether this act of charity would transform the relationship between the army and 
Kashmiris , leading Kashmiris to value the Indian army more. What was being openly 
suggested was that Kashmiris ought to be grateful for the army’s generosity, and thus 
transform themselves into loyal Indians.  
 
This ‘ambivalent feeling of gratitude’ that Hollenbach and Ruwanpura (2011: 21) describe of 
the recipients of post-disaster aid has acute resonance in Kashmir because the gift in 
question was widely viewed as a Trojan horse. The great ambivalence that Kashmiris felt 
towards the relief and rehabilitation provided by the army and various wings of the Indian 
state is precisely because it was readily understood as being potentially transformed into a 
social debt, the repayment of which required them to accept and embrace India 
unambiguously. Not unsurprisingly, most respondents instead chose to identify, appreciate 
and remember the role of local Kashmiri youth volunteers: a group to whom no such odious 
debt was attached. 
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As such, the analysis of the political consequences of natural disasters must take into account 
a model which is more complicated than that of a causal chain from natural disaster to 
transformative political outcomes. What complicates the model is that this rationale is 
internalised by the agents who populate it, and thus serves to guide their strategic actions 
and inactions on the ground. All those who are conscious of the political profit to be reaped 
from a disaster will seek to anticipate, pre-empt and influence events, images and narratives 
in the hope of instrumentalising the disaster to their advantage. The social stage of post-
disaster environments are populated by such actions of reinvention and narrative control. 
 
In conclusion, we mention in brief two broader consequences which this study offers for the 
politics of disasters. Firstly, it speaks to the way in which disasters serve as a lens. Moments 
of such sudden breakdown act to lift the veil of normality and provide a rare moment of 
clarity into the workings of power and the social relationships which govern people’s lives, 
rendering the status quo painfully visible. Whether or not this goes on to coalesce into a 
political 'tipping point', the process that ensues is one which separates emperors from their 
clothing.   
 
Secondly, it speaks to the relevance of performativity, perception and imaginaries as the 
pathways through which disasters result in new outcomes. While the transformative political 
potential of disasters can be exaggerated, and is to be taken with caution, this idea is 
nevertheless valuable insofar as it forms the calculus within which performances of relief and 
benevolence are enacted, and is the reason why they are also resisted in the social 
construction of conflicting disaster narratives and public memory.  
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